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1   Introduction 
 
Nowadays, mainstream macroeconomics is dominated by New Consensus Models (NCMs).
1 In these 
models there is again an impact of aggregate demand on output and employment, but only in the short 
run. Due to nominal and real rigidities the short-run Phillips curve is downward sloping. In the long 
run, however, there is no effect of aggregate demand on the ‘Non Accelerating Inflation Rate of 
Unemployment’ (NAIRU), which is determined by structural characteristics of the labour market, the 
wage bargaining institutions and the social benefit system.
2 Therefore, the long-run Phillips curve 
becomes vertical. In these models, monetary policy applying the interest rate tool is able to stabilise 
output and employment in the short run, but in the long run it is neutral and only affects inflation 
(Fontana/Palacio-Vera 2007). Fiscal policy is downgraded and is restricted to support monetary 
policies in achieving price stability (Arestis/Sawyer 2003). 
 
Post-Keynesians (PKs) have criticised these NCMs for a variety of reasons. Broadly summarised, the 
critique is related to the assumption of a stable long-run equilibrium NAIRU determined exclusively 
by supply-side factors to which actual unemployment can be adjusted by means of monetary policy 
interventions, on the one hand, and to the assumption of the independence of this NAIRU from the 
development of actual unemployment, and hence from effective demand and monetary as well as 
fiscal policies, on the other hand. 
 
Already Sawyer (2002) argued that the NAIRU should not be considered to be a strong attractor for 
actual unemployment. Stability of the NAIRU has been examined closer by Stockhammer (2004) 
including the effects of redistribution between profits and wages on effective demand which occur 
when actual unemployment deviates from the NAIRU. Hein (2006a) has focussed on the effects of 
redistribution between capitalists and rentiers on aggregate demand, triggered by accelerating or 
decelerating inflation. Both authors conclude that the NAIRU is not generally stable, but that a 
specific demand regime is required for stability. Considering the NCM recommendation of inflation 
targeting monetary policies in order to adjust actual unemployment to the NAIRU, Arestis/Sawyer 
(2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2006), Fontana/Palacio-Vera (2007), Hein (2004, 2006a), and Palacio-Vera 
(2005) have argued that monetary policy interventions will not be able to constrain instability in some 
cases for several reasons. Finally, long-run endogeneity of the NAIRU with respect to actual 
unemployment, and hence to macroeconomic and monetary policies, has been related to different 
channels. New Keynesian authors had already pointed out to labour market hysteresis 
(Blanchard/Summers 1987, 1988, Ball 1999). PKs have added further channels: capital stock and 
productivity growth effects of investment (Rowthorn 1995, 1999, Sawyer 2002, Arestis/Sawyer 
                                                 
1 See Clarida/Gali/Gertler (1999), Meyer (2001), and Carlin/Soskice (2006: 27-172) for NCMs. 
2 See Ball/Mankiw (2002), Blanchard/Katz (1997), Layard/Nickell/Jackman (1991: 361-396), and Mankiw 
(2001) for concepts of a NAIRU.  
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2004a: 73-99, 2005), adaptive wage and profit aspirations (Setterfield/Lovejoy 2006, Stockhammer 
2008), and distribution effects of interest rate variations (Hein 2006a). 
 
Because of the deficiencies and the problems of NCMs, PKs have started to amend these models and 
have proposed alternatives. First, the inflation generation and the income generation processes have 
been reformulated. Some PK authors have assumed the existence of a short-run inflation barrier and 
hence the NAIRU away (Atesoglu/Smithin 2006, Setterfield 2004, 2006a, 2006b), whereas others 
have accepted that there is such a short-run inflation barrier, which, however, is endogenous in the 
medium to long run through different channels (Lavoie 2004, 2006, Hein 2006a, Stockhammer 2008). 
Some authors have accepted the interest rate inverse IS-curve from the NCM (Atesoglu/Smithin 2006, 
Lavoie 2004, 2006, Rochon/Setterfield 2007-8a, Setterfield 2004, 2006a), whereas others have 
replaced it by a more elaborated PK/Kaleckian approach to effective demand allowing for real debt 
and different distribution effects (Hein 2006a, Rochon/Setterfield 2007-8b, Setterfield 2006b, 
Stockhammer 2008). 
 
Second, different economic policy conclusions, in particular with respect to monetary policies, have 
been drawn. Whereas some authors have argued that central banks’ inflation targeting is generally 
compatible with PK analysis (Fontana/Palacio-Vera 2007, Palley 2006, Setterfield 2006a), but have 
demanded a higher emphasis on real stabilisation and more adequate inflation targets, others have 
rejected any fine tuning by means of interest rate policies and have rather been in favour of stabilising 
the interest rate at some growth and employment conducive level (Gnos/Rochon 2007, Lavoie 1996a, 
Smithin 2004, Rochon/Setterfield 2007-8a, 2007-8b, Setterfield 2006b, Wray 2007). From this 
perspective it follows that nominal stabilisation should be delegated to wage or incomes policies 
(Arestis 1996, Davidson 2006, Hein 2002, 2004, 2006a, Kriesler/Lavoie 2007), and that fiscal policies 
should be in charge of real stabilisation in the short and in the medium to long run (Arestis/Sawyer 
2003, 2004a, 2004c, Gnos/Rochon 2007). 
 
What is lacking in the PK discussion so far is a basic but general PK synthesis model, which allows 
for a short-run inflation barrier, which captures the major causes for the short-run instability of the 
inflation barrier and hence the NAIRU, into which the major channels of medium- to long-run 
endogeneity of the NAIRU can be integrated, and which allows for the derivation of a complete PK 
macroeconomic policy-mix of monetary, fiscal and wage policies. This paper is intended to contribute 
to bridging this gap. Due to lack of space, however, we will not be able to integrate all the long-run 
endogeneity channels mentioned above.
3 
                                                 
3 For a more extensive treatment see Hein/Stockhammer (2007).  
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2   A basic Post-Keynesian model 
 
2.1   Production, finance, distribution and the inflation generation process 
 
Production, finance and rentiers’ income 
We assume a closed economy with only rudimentary economic activity of the state. There will be no 
taxes and no state employment in the model, but only deficit financed government demand. Under 
given conditions of production, there is just one type of commodity produced with a constant 
coefficient technology. Assuming away overhead labour, the labour-output-ratio and hence labour 
productivity (y) are constant up to full capacity output given by the capital stock. The capital-potential 
output-ratio (v), the relation between the capital stock (K) and potential output (Y
v), is also constant. 
The capital stock is assumed not to depreciate. The rate of capacity utilisation (z) is given by the 
relation between actual and potential output. Given these assumption, the supply constraint can be 
written with the aid of the definition of the rate of profit, relating gross capital income (Π) to the 
capital stock. The rate of profit is decomposed into the profit share (h), the rate of capacity utilisation 



















The supply constraint is only reached by accident and the economy usually operates below maximum 
capacity given by the capital stock, i.e. usually:  1 z < . 
 
The pace of accumulation is determined by entrepreneurs’ decisions to invest, independently of prior 
savings because firms have access to credit generated by a developed banking sector (‘initial finance’). 
We assume that long-term investment finance (‘final finance’) is supplied by firms’ retained earnings 
or by long-term credit of rentiers’ households (directly or through banks) (Hein 2007: chapt. 10). 
Introducing interest payments into the model, capital income or gross profits splits into (net) profit of 
enterprise (ΠF) and rentiers’ income (R).  
 
(2)  R F + Π = Π . 
 
With respect to interest rate and credit, we follow the PK ‘horizontalist’ monetary view developed by 
Kaldor (1970, 1982, 1985), Lavoie (1984, 1992: 149-216, 1996b) and Moore (1989) and assume that 
the interest rate is an exogenous variable for the production and accumulation process, whereas the 
quantities of credit and money are determined endogenously by economic activity. The central bank 
controls the base rate of interest, commercial banks mark-up the base rate and then supply the credit  
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demand they consider creditworthy at this interest rate. In what follows we consider just one interest 
rate as representative for the whole structure of interest rates. 
 
Writing in for the nominal rate of interest, we can define the real interest rate for given inflation 
expectations (






e p ˆ i i − = . 
 
The ‘ex post’ real interest rate, i, becomes endogenous to unexpected inflation (
u p ˆ ): 
 
(4)  ( )
u e u e
n p ˆ i p ˆ p ˆ i i − = + − = . 
 
Firms’ payments to rentiers are given by the stock of debt (B) at issue prices and the nominal rate of 
interest. Expected rentiers’ interest income (R
e) can be decomposed into a part compensating for the 
expected inflationary devaluation of the stock of nominal assets held by rentiers ( B p ˆ
e ), and into 
expected real net income determined by the ‘ex ante’ real rate of interest ( B i
e ). Repayment of debt is 
not considered explicitly: 
 
(5)  ( ) B p ˆ B i B p ˆ i B i R
e e e e
n
e + = + = = . 
 
Firms’ ‘real’ interest payments and rentiers’ ‘real’ gross income (R) are affected whenever unexpected 
inflation occurs. 
 
(6)  ( ) ( )B p ˆ p ˆ i B p ˆ i R
u e e u
n − + = − = . 
 
The debt-capital ratio relates the stock of debt at issue prices to the capital stock at production prices 





= λ . 
 
Since real debt effects caused by unexpected inflation are delegated to the real income flows between 




Conflicting claims, employment, unexpected inflation and distribution
4 
Unexpected inflation in our model is systematically generated by inconsistent income claims of 
rentiers, firms and workers.
5 The target gross profit share of firms (
T
F h ), which has to cover retained 
earnings and interest payments to rentiers, is given by mark-up pricing on unit labour costs in 
incompletely competitive goods markets. In the short run, we assume the mark-up to be constant up to 
full capacity output: 
 
(8)  1 h 0 , h h 0 0
T
F ≤ < = . 
 
If unexpected inflation arises, the realised profit share becomes: 
 
(9)  1 h 0 , p ˆ h h h 0
u
2 0 ≤ < − = , 
 
with h2 denoting the effect of unexpected inflation on the realised profit share. The higher h2, the less 
effective are firms in protecting the profit share against unexpected inflation caused by external shocks 
or workers’ wage aspirations. 
 




W h 1 W − = ] depends on the rate of employment (e), resp. 
unemployment (u), because unemployment has the function to contain distribution claims of labourers 
(Kalecki 1971: 156-164). At this stage we assume that workers and labour unions do not consider the 
inflationary macroeconomic effects of their nominal wage demands and the potentially restrictive 
monetary policy reactions. There is neither co-ordination between unions in different firms or 
industries, nor between wage bargaining parties and monetary policy, with an eye to avoiding 
macroeconomic externalities of wage bargaining: 
 
(10)  1 0 1 0
T
W W 0 , 1 W 0 , e W W ) h 1 ( ≤ ≤ < + = − . 
 
We do not assume full utilisation of productive capacities given by the capital stock to be necessarily 
accompanied by full employment. Therefore, the employment rate is a positive function of the rate of 
capacity utilisation, but these two rates are not necessarily equal: 
 
(11)  1 x 0 , xz e ≤ < = . 
                                                 
4 This part is developed on the basis of Stockhammer (2008) and extends the model presented there. For PK 
conflicting claims models of inflation see also Arestis/Sawyer (2004a: 73-87, 2005), Hein (2006a), Lavoie 
(1992: 391-421, 2002), Rowthorn (1977), and Sawyer (2002). 
5 Of course, there may also be exogenous shocks generating unexpected inflation.  
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Whenever there is unexpected inflation, the realised wage share becomes: 
 
(12)  2 1 0
u
2 1 0 W , W 0 , 1 W 0 , p ˆ W e W W ) h 1 ( ≤ ≤ < − + = − , 
 
with W2 denoting the effect of unexpected inflation on the realised wage share. The higher W2, the less 
effective are workers in protecting the wage share against unexpected inflation caused by external 
shocks or firms’ profit aspirations. 
 
With adaptive expectations ( 1 t
e
t p ˆ p ˆ − = ), we obtain the following short-run Phillips curve from 





1 t t t
u
t h W
1 h e W W
p ˆ p ˆ p ˆ p ˆ
+
− + +





1 t t h W
1 h e W W
p ˆ p ˆ
+
− + +
+ = − . 
 
In our model we have, at each point in time, a short-run inflation barrier which is similar to the 




W = + − , we obtain from equations 
(8) and (10) for the stable inflation rate of employment (e













Whenever unemployment falls short of the NAIRU, inflation will accelerate because the sum of the 
income claims exceeds output, and unexpected inflation will arise, fuelling future inflation 
expectations. Whenever unemployment exceeds the NAIRU, inflation will decelerate. 
 
Figure 1 shows the target wage shares of workers and firms as well as the realised wage as a function 
of employment in the upper part, and the related unexpected inflation in the lower part. 
 
Taking into account equation (11) for the relationship between the employment rate and the rate of 
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2.2   The income generation process
6 
 
Economic activity, and hence capacity utilisation and unemployment in our model, is determined by 
effective demand. For the analysis of saving and investment and the related goods market equilibrium 
we also assume that firms, rentiers and labourers form adaptive expectations. We assume a classical 
saving hypothesis, i.e. labourers do not save. The part of profits retained is completely saved by 
definition. The part of profits distributed to rentiers’ households, i.e. the interest payments, is used by 
those households according to their propensity to save (sR). Therefore, total expected saving (S) 
comprises expected retained profits (Π-inB) and saving out of expected interest income (SR). Taking 
equations (1), (2), (5), and (7) into account, we get the private saving rate (σ) which relates total 
saving to the capital stock: 
 









R n ≤ < − λ − =
+ − Π
= = σ . 
 
For the accumulation rate (g), relating net investment (I) to the capital stock, we follow the arguments 
in Kalecki (1954) and assume that investment decisions are positively affected both by expected sales 
and by expected retained earnings. Expected sales are determined by the rate of capacity utilisation. 
Retained earnings, in relation to the capital stock, are given by the difference between expected profits 
and expected payments to rentiers normalised by the capital stock, and hence by the nominal rate of 
interest and the debt-capital-ratio. Taking into account equations (1), (2), (5) and (7) again, we obtain: 
 
(17)  1 g , 0 g , g , g , i
v
z





g 2 2 1 0 n 2 1 0 < > ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣




We also include deficit-financed demand by the government (D) in relation to the capital stock (d = 





d = = . 
 
The goods market equilibrium is given by: 
 
                                                 
6 The ‘income generation process’ in this paper is based on Hein (2006a, 2006b) and extends the models 
developed there. Rochon/Setterfield (2007-8b), Setterfield (2006b) and Stockhammer (2008) have also 
introduced a more elaborated income generation process than the one in the NCMs. However, they do not take 
fully into account the distribution effects of unexpected inflation and of changes in the interest rate on effective 
demand when deriving the goods market equilibrium.  
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(19)  σ = + d g , 
 
and the stability condition by: 
 




























d g g s 1 i
z
− −
+ + − − λ
= . 
 
Since equation (21) is based on behavioural equations which by definition can only include expected 
inflation, the z
e-equilibrium derived from these equations is a planned, or an ‘ex ante’ equilibrium. 
Taking into account the relationship between the employment rate and the rate of capacity utilisation 
from equation (11), we obtain the following rate of employment determined by the ‘ex ante’ goods 
market equilibrium: 
 
(22)  () []
() 1 2




d g g s 1 i x
e
− −
+ + − − λ
= . 
 
3   Is the NAIRU a strong attractor in the short run and exogenous in the long run? 
 
The ‘ex ante’ goods market equilibrium rate of employment in equation (22) may deviate from the 
stable inflation rate of employment determined in equation (14). Such a deviation will trigger 
unexpected inflation which will change distribution between total profits and wages, on the one hand, 
and between retained profits and rentiers’ income, on the other hand. The interesting question is now 
whether unexpected inflation will adjust the goods market equilibrium towards the NAIRU or not. If 
there is no endogenous convergence towards the NAIRU, the next question is then whether an 
inflation targeting central bank can stabilise the system. This will be analysed in a second step. In the 
third step the medium- to long-run effects of variations in the interest rate triggered by central bank 
interventions will be briefly addressed. 
 
In order to be able to calculate the effects of changes in the inflation rate on the employment rate, the 
distribution effects of unexpected inflation from equations (6) and (9) have to be included into the 




(23)  () ( ) []






g g 1 p ˆ h h
v
1
d g g s 1 p ˆ i x
e
− − −
+ + − − λ −
= . 
 
Since unexpected inflation causes a deviation from the ‘ex ante’ goods market equilibrium 
employment rate in equation (22), equation (23) does not define an equilibrium in the behavioural 
sense, with expectations fulfilled. It is rather a temporary ‘ex post’ goods market equilibrium caused 
by unexpected inflation. Since there is no positive or negative excess demand in the goods market, 
economic agents will not change the activity level defined in equation (23), but adjust inflation 
expectations in the next period. However, unless the employment rate determined by the ‘ex post’ 
goods market equilibrium matches the stable inflation rate of employment, unexpected inflation will 
occur again, causing once more a deviation of the ‘ex post’ from the ‘ex ante’ goods market 
equilibrium and so on. 
 
3.1   The NAIRU as a strong short-run attractor without central bank interventions? 
 
From equation (23), the effect of unexpected inflation on the goods market equilibrium rate of 










g g 1 p ˆ h h
v
1












First, there is redistribution between gross profits and wages affecting the goods market equilibrium, 
with unexpected inflation (disinflation) reducing (raising) the profit share and increasing (reducing) 
the wage share. Through this channel unexpected inflation (disinflation) has a positive (negative) 
effect on economic activity and employment, as can be seen in the first term in the numerator. 
Therefore, our model is unambiguously wage-led, as far as the effects of redistribution between capital 
and labour on capacity utilisation and employment are concerned. Taken alone, this causes a further 
deviation of actual unemployment from the NAIRU. 
 
Second, there is redistribution among gross profits, with unexpected inflation (disinflation) reducing 
(raising) the share of rentiers’ income in gross profits. The effect of redistribution between firms and 
rentiers on economic activity through this channel is not clear in advance, but depends on the values of 
the rentiers’ propensity to consume and the elasticity of firms’ investment with respect to internal 
funds. If the former exceeds the latter (1-sR > g2), unexpected inflation and redistribution at the  
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expense of rentiers has a dampening effect on economic activity (‘puzzling case’). However, if the 
effect on firms’ investment is stronger than the one on rentiers’ consumption (g2 > 1-sR,) unexpected 
inflation will have a stimulating effect on economic activity and capacity utilisation (‘normal case’).
7 
 
For the total effect of unexpected inflation on the ‘ex post’ employment rate determined by the goods 
market, we therefore obtain: 
 
(23a’)  () 2 2
2















The requirements for a negative effect of unexpected inflation on the goods market equilibrium rate of 
employment driving it towards the NAIRU are quite restrictive. We do not only need the conditions 
for the ‘puzzling case’ with respect to the macroeconomic effects of redistribution between firms and 
rentiers (1-sR > g2), but also very weak demand effects of redistribution between capital and labour 
caused by unexpected inflation or disinflation. 
 
If the effect of unexpected inflation on the ‘ex post’ goods market equilibrium is positive: 
 
(23a’’)  () R 2 2
2





: if , 0
p ˆ
e







Unexpected inflation will move the ex post goods market equilibrium farther away from the 
distribution equilibrium. This is shown in Figure 2: The initial ‘ex ante’ goods market equilibrium rate 
of employment (e
e
1) exceeds the short-run stable inflation rate of employment (e
N) which triggers 
unexpected inflation. Since unexpected inflation has a positive effect on the ‘ex post’ goods market 
equilibrium rate of employment, this will move the goods market equilibrium even farther away from 
the distribution equilibrium. With adaptive expectations economic agents will make the current 
inflation rate the expected rate in the next period, the ‘ex ante’ goods market equilibrium will move to 
(e
e
2), and the ‘ex post’ goods market equilibrium function in employment-unexpected inflation space 
will shift accordingly. Unexpected inflation will be triggered again and, as a result, the goods market 
equilibrium will diverge monotonically from the stable inflation rate of employment. 
 
A negative relationship between unexpected inflation and the ‘ex post’ goods market equilibrium rate 
of employment as in equation (23a’), however, is only a necessary but not yet a sufficient condition 
for the NAIRU to be a strong attractor. In order to make the goods market equilibrium rate of 
                                                 
7 See Lavoie (1995) and Hein (2006b, 2007: 61-127) for a discussion of ‘puzzling’ and ‘normal’ cases in 




Figure 2  
























employment convergence towards the stable inflation rate, the absolute value of the slope of the ‘ex 
post’ goods market equilibrium employment curve has to exceed the slope of the short-run Phillips 
curve, as is shown in Figure 3.
8 
 
Therefore, for the NAIRU to be a strong attractor for the actual unemployment rate, the following 
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− − λ − −
− − −
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8 We may also have converging oscillations which are not shown graphically. 
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To sum up, the stability of the NAIRU requires a very low propensity to save out of rentiers’ income, 
a very low elasticity of investment with respect to internal funds, weak redistribution effects of 
unexpected inflation on labour income and effective demand, and a very flat short-run Phillips curve. 
Since there is no economic mechanism in our model which will guarantee this very special 
constellation to hold, we have to discuss the role of the central bank as a stabiliser of the NAIRU next. 
 
3.2   An inflation targeting central bank and the NAIRU as a short-run attractor? 
 
Applying the NCM idea of inflation targeting by the central bank, we have to bear in mind that the 
central bank controls the nominal rate of interest in our model. Therefore, this is the instrument an 
inflation targeting central bank can apply in order to achieve some target rate of inflation (
T p ˆ ). Here it 
is sufficient to assume that the central bank’s inflation target equals expected inflation (
e T p ˆ p ˆ = ) and 
p ˆ p ˆ
u ∆ =  
e
4 e  
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that the only aim of the central bank is to erase unexpected inflation from the system. Therefore, the 
central bank reaction function becomes: 
 
(25)  ( ) ( ) ()
, i 0 , i 0






















0 i  being the central bank’s estimation of the ‘equilibrium real interest rate’ and i1 the reaction 
parameter with respect to unexpected inflation. From equation (23) we obtain the following effect of a 
change in the nominal interest rate on employment determined by the goods market: 
 
(23b)  ( )






g g 1 p ˆ h h
v
1










Changing the nominal interest rate will be positively related to capacity utilisation and employment, if 
the ‘puzzling case’ with respect to the demand effects of redistribution between firms and rentiers 
prevails: 
 
(23b’)  2 R
n








Inflation targeting monetary policy interventions following equation (25) will hence move 
employment farther away from the stable inflation level. Note that the condition in equation (23b’), 
indicating the inappropriateness of inflation targeting monetary policies, is not equivalent with the 
NAIRU being a strong attractor from equation (24). Therefore, if (23b’) is valid, but (24) is not, 
neither is the NAIRU self-stabilising in the face of accelerating (decelerating) inflation, nor is 
monetary policy able to adjust actual unemployment to the NAIRU by means of raising (lowering) 
interest rates. In order to stabilise the NAIRU in this case, monetary policies would have to do just the 
opposite from what is suggested by equation (25), namely lowering (raising) the interest rate in the 
face of accelerating (decelerating) inflation. 
 
If the ‘normal case’ with respect to the demand effects of redistribution between firms and rentiers 
prevails, inflation targeting monetary policies will have the required effects on economic activity and 
employment: 
 
(23b’’)  R 2
n










If unexpected inflation caused by a deviation of unemployment from the NAIRU is not self-correcting, 
and the condition in equation (23b’’) is fulfilled, the NAIRU may therefore be turned into an attractor 
by inflation targeting monetary policies following the monetary policy rule in equation (25). In this 
case, the effects of changes in the nominal interest rate have to over-compensate the effects of 
unexpected inflation on capacity utilisation and employment. This does not seem to be a problem with 
unemployment falling short of the NAIRU and positive unexpected inflation. The central bank can 
always increase its instrument variable, the nominal interest rate according to equation (25) and wipe 
























For a stable adjustment it is again required that the absolute value of the slope of the (ex post) goods 
market equilibrium employment curve incorporating monetary policy responses (e
cb) has to exceed the 
slope of the short-run Phillips curve in employment-unexpected inflation space. Therefore, central 
banks have to be careful in their responses in order to avoid excessive over- and undershooting which 
would destabilise the system. 
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There are further limitations for monetary policies adjusting actual employment to the stable inflation 
level, if unemployment exceeds the NAIRU and unexpected inflation is negative, in particular in a 
climate of low inflation and hence low nominal interest rates. With unexpected disinflation or even 
deflation, a negative nominal interest rate according to equation (25) might be required in order to 
stabilise the system, which central banks cannot achieve due to the zero lower bound of its instrument 




3.3   Medium-run endogeneity of the NAIRU through monetary policy 
 
So far it has been shown that inflation targeting monetary policies, as the main stabilisation tool 
proposed by the New Consensus Model (NCM), in the short run are only adequate for certain values 
of the model parameters, but are either unnecessary, counterproductive, or limited in their 
effectiveness for other parameter values. In this section we integrate the medium-run effects of 
changes in the ‘ex ante’ real interest associated with inflation targeting monetary policies.
10 We only 
discuss the effects of changing interest rates on the distribution equilibrium in the medium run and 
ignore the associated effects on the goods market equilibrium, which may give rise to complex 
interacting dynamics of these two equilibria.
11 
 
In Hein (2006a) it has been argued that persistent changes in the ‘ex ante’ real interest rate affect 
firms’ target profit share in the medium to long run.
12 Since interest payments are costs from the 
perspective of the firm which have to be covered by the mark-up on unit labour costs, persistent 
changes in the ‘ex ante’ real interest rate will cause medium-run changes in the firms’ target mark-up. 
The firms’ target profit share from equation (8) has therefore to be expanded with h1 denoting the 
medium-run interest rate effect on the target profit share: 
 




F h 0 , 1 h 0 , i h h h ≤ ≤ < + = . 
                                                 
9 Another reason for asymmetric effects of central bank policies, not explicitly discussed in our model with only 
one interest rate, arises from the interaction of the central bank with the commercial banking sector. Whereas the 
central bank can always force commercial banks to increase market rates by means of increasing the base rate, 
commercial banks might not follow the central bank decreasing interest rates, in particular in a recession with 
increasing uncertainty and risk assessments. 
10 Further medium- to long-run endogeneity channels of the NAIRU with respect to actual unemployment, i.e. 
labour market persistence mechanisms, endogenous wage and profit aspirations, and the effects of capital stock 
growth, cannot be treated in this paper due to a lack of space. Their integration into the present model structure is 
indicated in Hein/Stockhammer (2007). 
11 For a discussion of the related dynamics associated with a persistent change in the real interest rate in a 
somewhat simpler model, see Hein (2006a). 
12 The idea that lasting variations in interest rates may affect functional income distribution and hence the share 
of wages and gross profits in total income goes back to Sraffa (1960: 33) and has been proposed, in particular, by 
Neo-Ricardian authors (see for example Pivetti 1991), but it can also be found in earlier PK work (Kaldor 1982: 
63, Pasinetti 1974: 139-141).  
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Taking into account the workers’ target wage share from equation (12), we obtain the following stable 
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A persistent change in the ‘ex ante’ real interest rate will have an inverse effect on the stable inflation 















































2 e  
e
2 e   N
2 e  
N






2 e  
N
1 e
p ˆ p ˆ






W ) h 1 ( −
T
F ) h 1 ( −
h 1−  





Applying the inflation targeting interest rate rule (equations 25) may therefore stabilise inflation in the 
short run, but in the medium run the effects on the firms’ target profit share may undermine the short-
run stabilisation effects and may create unexpected inflation again, triggering further central bank 
intervention, as is shown in Figure 5. 
 
4  A Post-Keynesian macroeconomic policy assignment 
 
From our results so far it follows that the NCM policy assignment has to be completely revised in 
order to achieve a high and stable medium-run employment rate with stable inflation (expectations). 
Following our model, we restrict our discussion to a closed economy. 
 
From the criticism of inflation targeting monetary policies developed above, different implications for 
more adequate monetary policies can be drawn. Applying the distinction made by Rochon/Setterfield 
(2007-8a, 2007-8b), either an ‘activist’ position or a ‘parking-it’ approach for the central bank 
applying the interest rate tool has been proposed by PKs. The proponents of the ‘activist’ position 
confirm the central bank’s responsibility for stable inflation and regard the interest rate as an 
appropriate tool to achieve this goal. Therefore, PK monetary economics is held to be generally 
consistent with inflation targeting by central banks and with the application of an interest rate 
operation procedure (Fontana/Palacio-Vera 2007, Palley 2006, Setterfield 2006a). Contrary to NCMs, 
however, they demand more careful counter-cyclical stabilisation by means of interest rate policies, 
taking into account the short- and medium-run real effects, as well as more reasonable, that is higher, 
inflation targets. The ‘parking-it’ position, however, refrains from recommending fine tuning the 
economy by means of interest rate policies, but focuses on the long-run distribution effects of the 
central bank setting the interest rate, which we have highlighted above, and recommends to stabilise 
the long-term rate of interest at a certain level. Different targets have been proposed. Smithin (2004), 
for example, suggests that the real interest rate should be set to zero, or as close to zero as possible, 
allowing rentiers to maintain their stock of real wealth but not to participate in real growth. Lavoie 
(1996a) and Setterfield (2006b) are in favour of setting the real rate of interest equal to productivity 
growth, which allows rentiers to participate in real growth and keeps distribution between rentiers, on 
the one hand, and firms and labourers, on the other hand, constant (Pasinetti’s (1981) ‘fair rate of 
interest’).
13 Since we have abstracted from productivity growth in our model, these two rules are 
essentially the same. Therefore, we obtain the following monetary policy rule: 
 
                                                 
13 Wray (2007) proposes a zero nominal interest rate in order to get rid of the rentiers’ class. However, this seems 
to imply overcoming the main characteristics of a monetary production economy, the advancement of credit in 
order to get production started. Obviously, with a zero nominal interest rate in a single interest rate model there 










0 i  being given by medium-run productivity growth. Central banks will have to adjust their policy 
instrument, the nominal interest rate, so that a constant expected real rate of interest equal to medium-
run productivity growth emerges. This implies adjusting the nominal interest rate to unexpected 
inflation at the end of each period. 
 
Note that monetary policies in this approach should neither pursue an inflation target nor make any 
attempts at adjusting the employment rate to some target. Of course, monetary policies remain 
responsible for the orderly working of the monetary and financial system, the definition of credit 
standards for refinance operations with commercial banks (credit controls), the implementation of 
compulsory minimum reserves of different types to be held with the central bank, the role of a ‘lender 
of last resort’ in the case of systemic crises, and so on.
14 
 
The NCM view on the role of wage formation and wage bargaining, demanding nominal and real 
wage flexibility by means of structural reforms in the labour market and decentralisation of wage 
bargaining in order to accelerate the adjustment towards the NAIRU and in order to reduce the 
NAIRU itself, cannot be sustained on the basis of our model. Nominal wage flexibility generates 
unexpected inflation whenever unemployment deviates from the NAIRU. This affects distribution 
between firms and rentiers, on the one hand, and between capital and labour, on the other hand, and is 
hence associated with real wage flexibility. With realistic parameters, nominal wage flexibility makes 
actual unemployment diverge further from the NAIRU in our model, as we have shown above. 
 
In order to avoid the destabilising effects of nominal and real wage flexibility, PKs advocate rigid 
nominal wages and allocate the role of nominal stabilisation to incomes or wage policies.
15 Therefore, 
nominal unit labour costs should grow at a rate similar to the country’s inflation target, which means 
that nominal wage growth should equal the sum of medium-run growth of labour productivity ( 0 w ˆ ) 




0 p ˆ w ˆ w ˆ + = . 
 
Following this wage formula will also keep income shares constant, provided that the mark-up in 
firms’ pricing remains constant and that imported material costs in an open economy grow in line with 
                                                 
14 This view is shared by the PK proponents of the ‘activist’ position (see for example Palley 2006) and of the 
‘parking-it’ position (see for instance Lavoie 1996a). A detailed discussion of central bank reactions towards 
financial market instabilities is outside the scope of the present contribution. 
15 See, for example, Arestis (1996), Davidson (2006), and Setterfield (2006a).   
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domestic unit labour costs (Kalecki 1954: 28-30). Under these conditions, the destabilising effects of 
real wage flexibility in wage-led economies will be avoided, too.  
 
The optimal way to achieve nominal stabilisation is to make the target wage shares of workers and 
firms compatible for a relevant range of employment rates. In the context of our model this requires to 
reformulate the workers target wage share from equation (10): 
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The stable inflation rate of employment and hence the NAIRU becomes a corridor and the Phillips 
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2 do not trigger any unexpected inflation and 
hence no cumulative processes will set in. In this case, demand management is free to choose a high 
level of employment close to e
N
2 without violating stable inflation rates. PKs argue that in particular a 
high degree of wage bargaining coordination at the national level, strong labour unions and employer 
organisations, and hence organised labour markets should be particularly suitable for pursuing this 
nominal stabilisation role of wage bargaining.
16 
 
Because of the associated with real and nominal stabilisation by means of monetary policies, the 
complete neglect of discretionary fiscal policies in the NCM turns out to be a major problem (see in 
particular Arestis/Sawyer 2003, 2004a, 2004c).
17 Therefore, PKs have argued in favour of real 
stabilisation by means of fiscal policies. This has again two dimensions: Since an adjustment of actual 
unemployment to a NAIRU cannot generally be expected, neither from market forces nor from 
monetary policies, fiscal policies are required for short-run real stabilisation. And since the NAIRU is 
                                                 
16 See Hein (2006a) and Kriesler/Lavoie (2007) for the implementation of coordinated wage bargaining into PK 
models and Hein (2002, 2004) for reviews of the related literature. 
17 For the inappropriateness of this view, also within a NCM framework, see Setterfield (2007), who shows that 
also within the NCM framework there is good reason to conclude that ‘… fiscal policy is at least as, if not, more 




endogenous to actual unemployment and hence to effective demand in the medium to long run, fiscal 
policies do not only have short-run real effects but also affect the long-run development of the 
economy. 
 
Arestis/Sawyer (2003) demonstrate that the major arguments put forward against a use of 
discretionary fiscal policies, ‘crowding out’ (through higher inflation and associated real balance 
effects or higher real interest rates) and the ‘Ricardian equivalence theorem’, are unconvincing, both 
on theoretical and empirical grounds. Both arguments have to assume that the economy operates at full 
employment equilibrium level. But if there is already full employment, there is no need to implement 
expansionary fiscal policies in order to achieve full employment and hence there is no need to think 
about ‘crowding out’ or ‘Ricardian equivalence’! Making use of government deficit spending for 
stabilising effective demand in the short and in the medium to long run, in the sense of ‘functional 
finance’, that is compensating private sector full (or stable inflation rate of) employment saving by 
government deficit spending,
18 however, requires that central banks do not interfere with expansionary 
fiscal policies and stick to a policy of low interest rates. 
 
In the context of our model real stabilisation should therefore be delegated to fiscal policies and 
equation (18) can be extended in the following way: 
 
(32)  ( ) 1 0
T
1 0 d 0 , d 0 , e e d d d < ≤ − + = , 
 
with d0 as permanent government deficit spending, which is required if employment is at target (e
T), 
and d1 as the reaction in the case of deviations of employment from target. The employment target is 
the maximum employment rate achievable without triggering unexpected inflation. 
 
The PK assignment or policy-mix and its effects can finally be seen in Figure 6. Wage policies, and 
hence wage bargaining parties, are mainly responsible for stable inflation rates, and hence for nominal 
stabilisation. Fiscal policies are responsible for the management of demand, maintaining effective 
demand at high employment levels, and hence for real stabilisation in the short and in the long run. 
Monetary policies by the central bank should neither aim at fine tuning the economy in real nor in 
nominal terms, and should thus not interfere with the tasks of wage and fiscal policies, but should 
rather focus on stable distribution between rentiers, on the one hand, and firms and labourers, on the 
                                                 
18 The ‘functional finance’ view, pioneered by Lerner (1943), recommends government deficits, the difference 
between government spending (G) and taxes (T), to mop up the excess of private sector planned saving (S) over 
planned investment (I), plus the difference between imports (M) and exports (X), at a desired (full employment) 
level of economic activity: G-T = S-I+M-X (see Arestis/Sawyer 2004c). Applying government deficit spending 
in the ‘functional finance’ way assures that there is always enough saving to fund government deficits by means 
of issuing bonds and/or increasing the central bank’s money supply, buying government bonds through open 
market operations.   
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other hand, in order to avoid destabilising distribution effects of changes in the interest rate. Co-
ordination of macroeconomic policies along these lines will be more promising for high employment 
and stable inflation rates than the NCM economic policy approach. 
 
Figure 6 




























We have shown that, depending on the model parameters, inflation targeting monetary policies as the 
main stabilisation tool in the NCM may be either unnecessary, counterproductive, or limited in their 
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effects of interest rate variations renders monetary policies completely inappropriate as an economic 
stabiliser. Based on these results we have argued that the NCM macroeconomic policy assignment 
should therefore be replaced by a PK assignment. Enhancing employment without increasing inflation 
will be possible if macroeconomic policies are coordinated along the following lines: The central bank 
targets distribution between rentiers, on the hand, and firms and labourers, on the other hand, and sets 
low real interest rates, wage bargaining parties target inflation, and fiscal policies are applied for short- 
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